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Abstract 
 
While it takes traditional internet worms hours to infect all the vulnerable hosts on the 
Internet, a flash worm takes seconds.  Because of the rapid rate with which flash worms 
spread, the existing worm defense mechanisms cannot respond fast enough to detect and 
stop the flash worm infections. 
 
In this project, we propose a geometric-based detection mechanism that can detect the 
spread of flash worms in a short period of time.  We tested the mechanism on various 
simulated flash worm traffics consisting of more than 10,000 nodes.  In addition to testing 
on flash worm traffics, we also tested the mechanism on non-flash worm traffics to see if 
our detection mechanism produces false alarms. 
 
In order to efficiently analyze bulks of various network traffics, we implemented an 
application that can be used to convert the network traffic data into graphical notations.  
Using the application, the analysis can be done graphically as it displays the large amount 
of network relationships as tree structures. 
 
 3
Table of Contents 
 
1. Introduction 
1.1. Contribution of this project paper to the field 
 
2. Background 
2.1. Common Structure of Flash Worms 
2.2. Various design issues of flash worms 
2.2.1. Spread Tree Topology 
2.2.1.1. Shallow Spread Tree 
2.2.1.2. Deep Spread Tree 
2.2.1.3. Robust Spread Tree 
2.2.2. Use of Threads 
2.2.2.1. No Thread 
2.2.2.2. Single Thread 
2.2.2.3. Multiple Threads 
2.2.3. TCP or UDP 
2.3. New Flash Worm Implementation Design 
 
3. Implementation 
3.1. Flash Worm Simulation 
3.1.1. Finding a suitable simulator 
3.1.2. Extending simulator to simulate the spread of flash worms 
3.1.2.1. Modified NS-2 default environments 
3.1.2.2. Added a new network packet 
3.1.2.3. Added two new network entities: Node and CenterNode 
3.1.2.4. Network Hierarchy Example 
3.1.3. Configurable Parameters 
3.2. Flash Worm Detection Mechanism 
3.2.1. Other defense mechanisms 
3.2.1.1. Random Network Address 
3.2.1.2. Honeypot 
3.2.2. Geometry-based Detection of Flash Worms 
3.2.3. Extending NS2 to simulate detection of flash worms 
3.2.3.1. Node Structure 
3.2.3.2. Double linked-list sorted by timestamp 
3.2.3.3. Array of pointers to node sorted by Node ID 
3.2.3.4. Dynamic determination of root nodes 
3.2.3.5. Dynamic determination of depth 
3.2.3.6. Exiting Parent-Child relationship 
3.2.3.7. Parent-Child Loop Avoidance 
3.2.4. Configurable Parameters 
 4
3.3. Post-analyzer 
3.3.1. Nam 
3.3.2. Custom post-analyzer 
 
4. Tests and Results 
4.1. Generate flash worm traffic 
4.2. Plot and analyze flash worm traffic 
4.3. Plot and analyze actual internet traffic 
4.4. Breaking our detection mechanism 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
6. Future Work 
 
Bibliography 
 
 
 
 5
List of Figures 
 
Figure 1: Hit-list and Corresponding Spread Trees 
Figure 2: Shallow Spread Tree Topology 
Figure 3: Deep Spread Tree Topology 
Figure 4: Robust Spread Tree Topology 
Figure 5: Single Thread Usage 
Figure 6: Network Topology of NS-2 
Figure 7: Loop Avoidance 
Figure 8: Nam screen-shot 
Figure 9: Sample Flash Worm Traffic 
Figure 10: Complete Tree 
Figure 11: Zoomed-in and ToolTip 
Figure 12: Detection Mechanism in Action 
Figure 13: Spread Tree of TCP traffic 
Figure 14: Spread Tree of UDP traffic 
 
 
 6
1. Introduction 
 
From the early computing days, many computer worms have been developed and 
spread on the Internet, often causing disruptions on the network.  As computer network 
architecture and internet security continue to advance to prevent the spread of worms, the 
worms, too, continue to evolve as well to find their ways to infect more hosts in reduced 
infection time. 
In recent years, due to faster internet connections and higher computing power available, 
it is now possible to develop a more powerful computer worm that can possibly bring down 
the whole Internet in less than 30 seconds [8].  Such a worm is termed a “Flash Worm”, and 
this master’s project will consider a possible defense against flash worms. 
To date, flash worms are only theoretical in the sense that no reported incidents have 
been filed.  However, one conjectured implementation of a flash worm is to pre-scan the 
entire Internet to generate a hit-list of all potentially vulnerable hosts.  The initial worm 
divides the hit-list into n blocks, infects one address from each block, and then 
communicates the list of remaining addresses for each block to newly infected host [2].  
This process continues until all the addresses on the hit-list have been infected.  Similar to 
the Slammer worm, which is capable of infecting “more than 90 percent of vulnerable hosts 
within 10 minutes” [6], the flash worm effectively utilizes network bandwidth; the higher 
the bandwidth, the faster the worm spreads.  However, in contrast to the Slammer worm, 
this flash worm implementation does not scan for vulnerable target addresses while 
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spreading.  Since searching for vulnerable target addresses is a slow process, eliminating 
this process allows the unprecedented spread rate of flash worms. 
Because of the rapid speed with which a flash worm spreads, some of the prediction and 
mitigation algorithms applicable to other worms are not appropriate for flash worms.  In 
this project, we are proposing a new geometry-based detection algorithm of flash worms, in 
which the local network activity is monitored.  Based on the monitored activity, we plan to 
create a tree to indicate the spread of a possible flash worm.  This “spread tree” is designed 
to detect the tree-like structure a flash worm is likely to use to propagate the target host list.  
If the depth of a spread tree reaches some predefined threshold, shutting down the network 
will prevent the flash worm from spreading further.  To avoid false alarms, the spread tree 
must be pruned as well as updated continuously. 
In the rest of this paper, we first describe the known conjectured implementations of 
flash worm.  Section 2 discusses the essential components of flash worm implementation 
structure.  Section 2 also explains how differentiating these components can result in 
different infection behaviors.  Section 3 details the design and implementation of our 
proposed detection method.  Section 4 shows our simulation test processes and the result.  
Section 5 summarizes and concludes the project. 
 
1.1. Contribution of this project paper to the field 
This paper provides a perspective of the various flash worm implementation 
scenarios.  It also discusses how we implemented our simulation of flash worm 
infections.  While many large-scale worm simulators are implemented by utilizing a 
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worm model, our simulator is implemented to produce the packet-level data traffic 
among 10,000 network hosts.  Furthermore, the paper proposes an effective flash 
worm detection algorithm and explains how we visualized the vast amounts of flash 
worm data using a post-analyzer. 
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2. Background 
 
Because there have been no incidents of flash worm outbreaks reported in the wild yet, 
there is no solid example of an actual flash worm implementation.  However, there are 
many conjectured implementations of flash worms by various researchers.   
 
2.1. Common Structure of Flash Worms 
Despite the differences, every flash worm implementation is expected to have the 
following common components: 
 
• Hit-list 
While traditional internet worms scan for target hosts whenever they infect a 
new host, flash worms do not perform this often time-consuming process.  
Instead, flash worms utilize a hit-list, which contains the list of all the target 
host addresses. 
o Hit-list preparation process 
Prior to instantiating the spread of flash worms, the worm author has to 
scan the entire Internet address to determine the vulnerable hosts.  If the 
author has a fast Internet connection and a high processing power, this 
scanning can be done in a day.  However, to reduce the risk of being 
detected by defense systems, the author may want to purposely slow 
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down the scanning process.  Such stealthy scanning may take several 
weeks. 
 
o Typical size of one Host Address 
Since most of the network hosts are in IPv4 domain at this time, the usual 
number of bytes required to represent one host address is 32.  That means, 
a single UDP packet can store about 35 host addresses if the maximum 
byte size of a UDP packet is 1200. 
 
o Low failed infection attempts 
In addition to the boost of spread speed, the use of the hit-list also protects 
flash worms from some existing worm containment defenses.  For 
example, the containment defenses that look for unusually high number of 
missed connections cannot detect the spread of flash worms because most 
infection attempts are likely to succeed. 
 
 
• Maximum infection number 
Given a list of addresses to infect, each host does not infect all the listed 
addresses.  Instead, each host attempts to infect a fixed number of addresses at 
most and propagates the remaining addresses to other hosts. 
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• `Spread Tree 
Even though the usage of the hit-list enables the blazing spread rate of flash 
worms, it also restricts the flash worms to spread following a tree-like pattern.  
We call this spread pattern the spread tree.  For example, the hit-list of Fig. 1 (a) 
with maximum infection number of 3 creates the spread tree shown in Fig. 1 (b). 
 
<Fig. 1: Hit-list and 2 Corresponding Spread Trees> 
(a) The hit-list contains 11 target addresses; (b) The spread tree formulation if each node attempts to 
infect 3 other nodes at most; (c) Each node infects 5 nodes at most.  Note that only node 1 has the enough 
target addresses to infect 5 nodes. 
 
To help us analyze the flash worm infection behavior later, let us define some 
important components of spread trees: 
o Parent-Child relationship 
 There is a one-to-one parent-child relationship if one host infects 
another host.  For example, in Fig (b) above, node 6 is a parent 
of node 7, and node 7 is a child of node 6. 
 
o Depth (or Generation) number 
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 The depth of a node is the maximum length of the path from the 
root to the node.  For example, in Fig (b), node 7 has depth of 2 
and node 10 has depth of 1. 
 The depth can also be called generation number.  For example, in 
Fig (b), nodes 2, 6, and 10 are all in the same first generation. 
 The maximum number of generations required to infect N hosts 
if each host infects K other hosts can be determined by this 
formula:  
¾ O(logK N) 
For example, in Fig (b), the maximum generation number is  
O(log3 11) = 3. 
 
o Node creation (or infection) time 
 Each node has its associated creation time.  This is the time the 
node was first infected by a flash worm.  Note that the nodes 
from a same generation should have similar creation time since 
they are expected to be infected at about the same time. 
 
o Total infection time 
 The total infection time is the amount of time required to infect 
all the hosts listed in a hit-list.  The total infection time can also 
be equivalent to the node creation time of the last leaf node. 
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 2.2. Various design issues of flash worms 
 
When designing a flash worm, the worm author has to take the following issues into 
the account as they will characterize the worm infection behavior: 
 
2.2.1. Spread Tree Topology 
The maximum number of infections each host attempts defines the shape of the 
spread tree.  The authors of [7], who first published the work regarding flash worms, 
have laid out these three spread tree topologies. 
 
2.2.1.1.  Shallow Spread Tree 
In a shallow spread tree topology, each host tries to infect many other hosts.  
As can be seen in Fig. 2 below, it takes 3 generations to infect 155 hosts if 
each host attempts to infect 5 other hosts. 
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 <Fig. 2: Shallow Spread Tree Topology> 
 
Advantage:  
 It takes a short amount of time to infect all the target hosts since this 
topology requires a small number of generations to infect many hosts.  
Having a couple of hosts with OC-12 connection near at the root node, [8] 
claims that such a shallow spread tree can infect all the vulnerable hosts on 
the Internet less than 1 second. 
 Furthermore, this topology is tolerant against a failed infection.  A 
network host may not get infected by a flash worm for many reasons.  The 
host may no longer have a security hole, or the infection packet may be lost.  
The problem is if a host is not infected, the hosts constituting its child nodes 
in the spread tree will not get infected either.  Fortunately, the shallow 
spread tree topology is tolerant against such infection failures.  For example, 
in the Fig. 2 above, suppose one host from first generation fails to get 
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infected.  Then, that means, only 1 out of 5 failed and we still have 4 other 
hosts to continue the infections. 
 
Disadvantage:  
As each host tries to infect many other hosts, this topology places 
significant computation burden on each host.  Furthermore, the traditional 
worm defense systems which look for sudden increase in the number of 
network connections from a host may detect the worm activities. 
 
2.2.1.2.  Deep Spread Tree 
In a deep spread tree topology, each host tries to infect only a small number 
of other hosts.  If we were to infect the same 155 hosts again using the deep 
spread tree topology from Fig 3, it would require 7 generations this time.  
Recall that the previously discussed shallow spread tree would require only 
3 generations. 
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 <Fig. 3: Deep Spread Tree Topology> 
 
Advantage:  
 Since each host infects a small number of other hosts, the 
aforementioned defense systems, which look for sudden increase in the 
number of network connections, cannot be effective against this topology. 
 
Disadvantage:  
 When comparing to the shallow spread tree topology, this topology 
requires more generations to infect the same target hosts.  Since there is a 
propagation delay in sending the target list from a generation to the next, 
more generations imply longer propagation delay.  Therefore, this topology 
takes long time to infect all the target addresses. 
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 Furthermore, if one node from the early generation fails to get infected, 
the impact can be devastating.  For example, in the Fig 3 above, if one node 
from generation 1 fails to get infected, the half of the spread tree would not 
get infected.  
 
♦ Notes regarding our design ( I ) 
The flash worm detection mechanism, which we propose in this paper, is 
effective only for this deep spread tree topology because the mechanism 
requires to see the spread tree grow to reach a certain depth. 
 
 
2.2.1.3.  Robust Spread Tree 
One of the difficulties of implementing flash worms is to obtain a perfect 
hit-list.  Since the Internet continues to change as new hosts are being added 
and deleted, some infection attempts may fail.  As discussed in the deep 
spread tree topology section, if an infection attempt fails near at the root of 
the spread tree, the half of the spread tree may not be infected. 
To provide a degree of resilience to the failed infection attempts, the 
following topology can be used. 
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<Fig. 4: Robust Spread Tree Topology> 
 
In this robust topology, each host tries to infect its neighbor’s child hosts.  
Even though this redundancy may consume additional network bandwidth 
and processing power, it protects from a failed parent node to decide the fate 
for all of its child nodes. 
 
 
2.2.2. Use of Threads 
In addition to defining the spread tree topology, the flash worm author should 
decide whether to use threads.  The use of threads at the application layer can 
impact the total infection time. 
 
2.2.2.1.  No Thread 
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If a thread is not used, then a host has to wait until it receives all the target 
addresses from its parent.  Until the receiving is completed, the host cannot 
infect other hosts.   
The hosts near at the root node are expected to wait the longest because the 
target address list is usually huge.  On the other hand, as the host is closer to 
the leaf nodes, the waiting time is expected to be significantly reduced. 
 
♦ Notes regarding our design ( II ) 
Our simulation implementation of flash worms does not use thread.  
Therefore, there are propagation delays which vary with respect to the size 
of the target list. 
 
2.2.2.2.  Single Thread 
In an implementation that can utilize a single thread, the host can create an 
instance of thread to infect its child node immediately after a target address 
is received.  The Fig. 5 illustrates the procedure. 
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 <Fig. 5: Single Thread Usage> 
(a) At t0, the root node infects one other node; (b) At t1, the root node infects second node.  The previous child 
node has received a target address from the root node and is ready to infect another node.  The node infects 
another node by creating a thread. (Note that the node is still receiving the target list from its parent); (c) At t3, 
three new nodes are infected; (d) At t6, all nodes are infected. [2] 
 
By using a single thread, a node does not have to wait until it receives all the 
target address, which significantly reduces the total infection time. 
 
2.2.2.3.  Multiple Threads 
Multiple threads can be used in the environment where a node receives 
multiple target addresses from multiple sources at the same time.  For 
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example, in a robust spread tree topology, a node may receive multiple 
target addresses from different parent nodes. 
 
 
2.2.3. TCP or UDP 
 Another important decision a flash worm author has to make is whether to 
use TCP or UDP.  TCP establishes and maintains a connection before 
transmitting the data, which requires more packets to be sent than UDP.  On the 
other hand, UDP does not establish a connection and data can be transmitted 
between two hosts right away.  Therefore, a UDP-based flash worm can infect 
faster than a TCP-based flash worm. 
 Even though the use of TCP can be slower than using UDP, the connection-
oriented nature of TCP provides guaranteed delivery of data whereas UDP does 
not provide this.  As discussed in the spread tree topology section, missed 
delivery of infection packets in the early stage of worm infection can have a huge 
impact.  Therefore, the worm author has to balance the infection speed against the 
risk of missed connections when choosing the network transmission protocol. 
 
♦ Notes regarding our design ( III ) 
Our simulation of flash worms uses UDP.  Only one UDP packet is required 
to infect a target host. 
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 2.3. New Flash Worm Implementation Design 
There are many hypothetical implementation designs of flash worms known today.  
However, there may be other flash worm implementation designs still unknown.  
Below, we propose a new flash worm implementation design. 
Central Hit-list Server based Design 
• Instead of distributing the address list from a parent node to a child node, the 
hit-list is available from a central server. 
• When a new host is infected, it asks the central server for target addresses.  
Once the central server receives a packet from a target address, it removes the 
target address from the hit-list (because it knows that the target address is 
already infected). 
• For simplicity and efficiency, every packet is in UDP.  Assuming a UDP packet 
can store 1200bytes, a single UDP packet can store about 35 IP Addresses.  That 
means, a simple Request-Reply UDP packets will get 35 target lists from the 
server. 
• Advantage:  
o The central server can efficiently distribute the hit-list  
 No more initial huge delay in propagating a large hit-list 
 Resilient to failed infections; if a node fails to get infected, other 
node will infect its child nodes. 
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o The hit-list can be updated dynamically as new vulnerable addresses are 
added.  Also, incorrect addresses can be removed after some timeout. 
o The current infection progress state can be monitored in real time. 
• Disadvantage:  
o The hit-list server can be heavily loaded. 
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3. Implementation 
 
In this section, we discuss how we implemented a simulator to generate the flash worm 
traffic.  Then, we discuss how we developed a new application to visualize and better 
understand the flash worm traffic and to test our proposed detection mechanism. 
 
3.1. Flash Worm Simulation 
3.1.1. Finding a suitable simulator 
In order to study the defense against flash worms, we needed to have a 
simulator to simulate the behavior of flash worms.  Because learning to use a new 
simulator in depth is a difficult and often time-consuming process, we wanted to 
verify that a specific simulator is capable of simulating many nodes and generating 
the packet-level traffics prior to learning the simulator in depth. 
 
 List of Simulators: 
Following are simulators that can simulate a vast number of nodes: 
1) Scalable Simulation Framework 
a. http://www.ssfnet.org/homePage.html 
b. Outdated - Latest simulator update was in year 2004 
2) Simnet   
a. http://simnet1.isi.jhu.edu/  
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b. The implementation of a worm model was available but the simulator 
did not have documentation. 
3) OPNET  
a. http://www.opnet.com/  
b. This is a commercial-quality network simulator product.  Student 
license was available that required a complex registration. 
4) GTNetS 
a. http://www.ece.gatech.edu/research/labs/MANIACS/GTNetS/ 
b. A network simulator from Georgia Tech University – complex to 
install and use 
5) NS-2 
a. http://www.isi.edu/nsnam/ns/ 
b. Although well documented, very complex to use. 
 
Although it seemed to be very complex to use at first, we decided to use NS-
2 because it was easy to install and had some form of the user documentation.  
However, the other simulators have the capability to do the project as well. 
 
 
3.1.2. Extending simulator to simulate the spread of flash worms 
3.1.2.1.  Modified NS-2 default environments 
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• By default, NS-2 uses a flat-routing scheme, in which every node knows 
the address of every other node, resulting in routing table size to the 
order of n2 for n number of nodes.  To reduce the memory requirement 
of simulations over large network topologies, we created a hierarchical-
routing scheme.  For hierarchical-routing, each node knows only about 
those nodes in its level, thus the routing table size was reduced to the 
order of log n. 
 
3.1.2.2.  Added a new network packet: 
We enhanced NS-2 to support the following new network packet:  
• Packet Format 
struct hdr_fworm { 
  nsaddr_t dst; 
  nsaddr_t src; 
  nsaddr_t target_range_first; 
  nsaddr_t target_range_last; 
}; 
o There are four fields in the packet 
 dst = packet destination address 
 src = source address 
 target_range_first = first range of address to infect 
 target_range_last = last range of address to infects 
o Instead of transmitting each target address of the hit-list, we 
decided to send the range representing the list.  So, a single 
packet can infect and propagate the target addresses.  The 
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propagation delay to transmit the target addresses is simulated by 
forcing infected host to wait for the estimated delay before 
infecting other hosts.  The delay varies with respect to the range 
size. 
 
3.1.2.3.  Added two new network entities: Node and CenterNode 
o An entity Node represents a host that is vulnerable to flash worm 
infections. 
o The entity CenterNode is a special node that is not vulnerable to flash 
worm infections.  It is located at the center of the network hierarchy, and 
it acts as a router to forward flash worm packets amongst Nodes.  Every 
flash worm data has to go through this entity first.  Since it can see all 
the flash worm traffics, it is also the ideal place to implement our 
detection mechanism. 
 
3.1.2.4.  Network Hierarchy Example 
Fig. 6 displays an example of simulated network topology in NS-2. 
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 <Fig. 6: Network Topology of NS-2, consisting of two clusters> 
 
o There is always one CenterNode in the topology, which has the address 
0.0.0 and is located at the center. 
o Every packet is sent to CenterNode first.  Then, the CenterNode 
forwards the packet to the correct destination. 
o Each cluster can have maximum of 128 nodes. 
o Of the address form 0.X.Y, X represents the cluster number and Y 
represents the node ID within the cluster. 
o A node with the address form of 0.X.0 is a head of the cluster. 
o Both the CenterNode and the head of a cluster have enough buffer size 
to handle heavy network traffics. 
 
3.1.3. Configurable Parameters 
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Following are the configurable parameters to simulate various flash worm 
scenarios: 
o Number of clusters 
 The simulator can support up to 100 clusters.  Since each cluster 
has 128 nodes, this means that the simulator can simulate 12,800 
nodes. 
 Our simulation has been performed on a computer with 1GB of 
RAM.  A computer with higher RAM space should be able to 
simulate more than 100 clusters. 
o Infection number 
 This is the maximum number that each host tries to infect other 
hosts. 
o Link delay 
 There is a network propagation delay between the CenterNode 
and the head of a cluster.  Otherwise specified, we use 5ms as the 
default delay. 
 There is also a network propagation delay between nodes and the 
head of the nodes.  Otherwise specified, we use 10ms as the 
default delay. 
 If using the default delay values, the end-to-end propagation 
delay between 2 hosts is 10 + 5 + 5 + 10 = 30 ms. 
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 3.2. Flash Worm Detection Mechanism 
 
Since flash worms spread so fast, the traditional signature-based defenses or manual 
human intervention cannot respond in enough time to stop the flash worm propagation. 
Therefore, much effort has gone into designing automated flash worm containment 
mechanisms.  Besides the one we are proposing in this paper, there are other defense 
mechanisms against flash worms. 
 
3.2.1. Other defense mechanisms 
3.2.1.1.  Random Network Address 
[1] proposes a defense system against flash worm in which the address of 
the Internet hosts are changed frequently.  By doing so, the goal is to make 
the hit-list, which is pre-generated by the flash worm authors, unreliable and 
useless.  However, the mechanism requires a significant modification of the 
existing Internet infrastructure. 
 
3.2.1.2.  Honeypot 
Traditionally, a honeypot is a fake network environment where various 
viruses and worms can be lured into a trap.  If the address of a honeypot is in 
the hit-list, attempting to infect the honeypot may prevent a part of the 
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spread tree to be infected.  However, as discussed in the robust spread tree 
topology section, there are ways to get around this trap. 
 
 
3.2.2. Geometry-based Detection of Flash Worms 
3.2.2.1.  Basic Idea 
The basic idea is to create a spread tree by monitoring network traffic 
activities, and if a predefined threshold level of depth is reached, shutdown 
the network.  The spread tree is pruned periodically by removing the old 
nodes so that the tree would not grow continuously and trigger false alarms.  
By carefully choosing the threshold depth and the prune period, it should be 
difficult to trigger the false alarm by non-flash worm packets. 
 
 
3.2.3. Extending NS2 to simulate detection of flash worms 
3.2.3.1.  Node Structure 
In order to create the spread tree, we use the following tree node structure: 
• Struct node { 
 int nodeID;  // ID (or address) of this node 
 int depth;   // depth (or generation) number 
 double timestamp; // node creation time 
 
 node ** children; // list of children 
 node ** parent;  // list of parents 
 int numChildren;  // number of children 
 int numParent;  // number of parents 
 int maxChildren;  // max number of children 
 int maxParent;  // max number of children 
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 node * before;  // for list sorted by time 
 node * after; // for list sorted by time 
}; 
 
 Note that our node implementation can support multiple parents.  
This late added feature required more complex computation to be 
performed dynamically.  For example, it required the support of 
parent-child loop avoidance and recursive depth determination which 
are discussed below.  If the node were to support only one parent, the 
implementation could have been much simpler. 
 
 
3.2.3.2.  Double linked-list sorted by timestamp 
To minimize the cost of updating the tree structure, we used the following 
double linked-list sorted by timestamp: 
o Linked-list 
 
Node 6 
Time: 13 
Node 1 
Time: 10 
 
 
 
 
 By using this linked-list, there is no need to search for old nodes in 
the pruning process. 
Remove  
nodes starting 
from head 
Add new 
nodes starting 
from tail 
 
3.2.3.3.  Array of pointers to node sorted by Node ID 
To allow us to easily access the node structure, we created an array of 
pointers to node structure that is sorted by Node ID. 
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o Node * pNodes[size of max node]; 
 For example, given the a nodeID X, we could access the node 
structure by *pNodes[X] 
 
3.2.3.4.  Dynamic determination of root nodes 
Through out the operation, there can be many splits or merges of spread 
trees.  For example, a tree is split if the root node is removed; two trees are 
merged if one node infects one node on the other tree.  Since it would be 
very cumbersome to maintain a list of all the root nodes, we decided to 
maintain no explicit list of root nodes.  Instead, if the parent number of a 
node is 0, the node is the root. 
 
3.2.3.5.  Dynamic determination of depth 
Instead of updating the depth of every child node when the depth of a parent 
node is changed, depth is determined recursively as following: 
 depth = maximum depth of parents + 1 
 
3.2.3.6.  Exiting Parent-Child relationship 
 If there is an existing parent-child relationship between two nodes when 
creating a new relationship, we decided to do nothing.  Alternatively, we could 
have updated the node creation time so that the node would be pruned at a later 
time.  However, we thought doing so would consume significant computation 
 34
power to reorganize the linked-list.  For example, if two nodes are 
communicating using a TCP connection or running some application, there 
would be many rapid requests to update the node creation time in a short period 
of time.  Therefore, we decided that it would be better not to update the node 
creation time. 
 
3.2.3.7.  Parent-Child Loop Avoidance 
Before a new parent-child relationship is created, a check is performed to 
prevent the formation of a parent-child loop.  See Fig. 7 below. 
 
<Fig. 7: Loop Avoidance> 
(a) No loop; (b) There is a loop, connecting node 1,6, 8 
 
In Fig 7(a), there is no loop.  However, in Fig 7(b) there is a loop among the 
nodes 1, 6, and 8.  If there is a loop, we cannot determine the depth correctly 
since we cannot determine which node is the parent/root node.  Therefore, if 
a new parent-child relation creates a loop, we remove that relationship right 
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away.  There can be potential attacks against this restriction, one of which 
we discuss later. 
 
3.2.4. Configurable Parameters 
 Similar to the configurable parameters in flash worm simulation, there are 
configurable parameters for detection mechanism. 
 
o Depth Threshold 
 This is the maximum number of depth allowed before an alarm is 
triggered to notify that spread of flash worms has detected. 
 Too lower number is likely to generate many false alarms; too high 
number would not detect flash worm early enough to react. 
 
o Prune Period 
 This is the amount of time elapsed before next pruning occurs. 
 
o Prune Amount 
 This is the amount of time we subtract from the current time, and any 
nodes created before that time is pruned.  For example, if Prune 
Amount is 5 seconds and current time is 30 seconds, the nodes with 
creation time less than 30 – 5 = 25 seconds will be removed from the 
spread tree. 
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 3.3. Post-analyzer 
 
 In this section we discuss how we implemented a post-analyzer to help visualizing 
the simulated result. 
 
3.3.1. Nam 
 NS-2 provides Nam, which is a graphical utility to display the network topology 
and simple network traffic activities.  We have implemented Nam such that when a 
node is infected, the color of the node changes to red.  Following is a sample output 
of running the simulation consisting of 10 nodes. 
o nam result 
 
<Fig. 8: Nam screen-shot> 
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 o Node0 is the CentralNode 
o Nodes 1,2,3,4,6,7,9 have been infected at the time 
o Nodes 5,8,10 have not been infected yet. 
o This is a screen shot of a specific simulation time; eventually, every node 
will get infected. 
o Disadvantages: 
 If plotting a lot of nodes, Nam cannot position nodes evenly across 
the screen.  Nam will display all the nodes close to the CenterNode 
and we will eventually see a big dark circle in the middle. 
 Nam cannot automatically order the nodes into a tree form. 
 
3.3.2. Custom post-analyzer 
 To resolve all Nam’s shortcomings, we have implemented a custom post-
analyzer using MFC from Microsoft Visual Studio.  Following are the features of 
the post-analyzer: 
o Able to plot a vast number of nodes on a screen 
o Able to zoom in (or out) to see detailed structure 
o Able to see detailed information of a node when the mouse is placed over 
the node 
 The information is displayed in a tooltip 
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• The information is consisted of node address, node creation 
time, and depth.  The tooltip can be easily modified to display 
more information. 
o Able to manually start, stop, and rerun the simulation at any time. 
o Able to run the detection mechanism 
 The detection mechanism is implemented in both NS-2 and the post-
analyzer.  The detection mechanism in NS-2 can be used to monitor 
the flash worm packets as soon as they are generated by the 
simulator.  However, the configurable parameter for the detection 
mechanism such as Prune Period cannot be changed after the 
simulator is started and the testing of the detection mechanism 
always requires regeneration of flash worm traffic.  On the other 
hand using the post-analyzer, the configurable parameters of the 
detection mechanism can be changed and tested at any time.  The 
post-analyzer can also apply the detection mechanism on saved flash 
worm traffic so the flash worm traffic does not need to be 
regenerated.  Therefore, we prefer to use NS-2 only to generate the 
flash worm traffic and run the detection mechanism on the post-
analyzer. 
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4. Tests and Results 
In this section we explain our testing setup and provide an analysis on the result. 
 
4.1. Generate flash worm traffic 
Flash worm traffic was generated by running NS-2 simulator with following 
parameters: 
• Configurable Parameters: 
o Number of clusters = 10 
o Infection number = 2 
 
• We disabled the detection mechanism of the simulator.  If the detection 
mechanism is disabled, NS-2 automatically outputs all the flash worm traffic 
data into a text file. 
 
• Traffic Format: 
o The traffic is organized by the following fields:   
 Event Time (in ms), Node Address, Parent Node Address, Target 
Address Size 
o Each field is separated by a space. 
o For example, Fig. 9 displays the first five flash worm data. 
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 line 1:  0.1 128 0 1279 
line 2:  19.2 768 128 639 
line 3:  19.2 129 128 638 
line 4:  28.8 769 768 318 
line 5:  28.8 1088 768 319 
 
 
 
 
 
 
<Fig. 9: Sample Flash Worm Traffic> 
 
 Line 1 has the initial flash worm data.  The line “0.1 128 0 1279” 
means “Node 128 was infected by Node 0 at time 0.1 and the 
target address size is 1279”.  Since we simulate 10 clusters and 
each cluster has 128 nodes, the initial hit-list size of 1279 is 
correct. 
 Line 2 and 3 shows that Node 128 correctly infected 2 other 
nodes at 19.2 ms.  Note that the target address list is divided into 
639 and 638 and distributed to Nodes 768 and 129 respectively. 
 Since our simulation does not utilize threads, the node has to wait 
until it receives all the target addresses from its parent.  From line 
1 and 2, we can see that it took 19.2 – 0.1 = 19.1 ms to transmit 
target list size of 639 from Node 128 to Node 768.  Also, from 
line 2 and line 4, we can see that it took 28.8 – 19.2 = 9.6 ms to 
transmit target list size of 318 from Node 768 to Node 769.  
Therefore, a higher propagation delay is required to transmit a 
larger target list. 
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 4.2. Plot and analyze flash worm traffic 
After generating the flash worm traffic, we plotted and analyzed the traffic using 
our post-analyzer. 
 
• Spread Tree Topology 
o Fig. 10 displays all the 1280 target nodes organized into a spread tree 
topology. 
 
<Fig. 10: Complete Tree> 
Without Pruning 
 
 In this test setup, there is no pruning because we specified 
sufficiently long pruning time period to display the complete tree 
structure. 
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 o Fig. 11 displays a zoomed-in screen shot.  It also shows a tooltip, which 
describes the detailed information regarding Node 854. 
 
<Fig. 11: Zoomed-in and ToolTip> 
 
 
• Running detection method 
o Fig. 12 shows that our detection method found the spread of flash worms. 
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 <Fig. 12: Detection Mechanism in Action> 
 
o For the detection method parameters, Prune Time is set to 3.5630 and 
Threshold Depth is set to 5. 
o The nodes and lines marked in blue color indicate the pruned entities.  In 
the above example, the first 3 generations have been pruned. 
 
 
4.3. Plot and analyze the actual internet traffic captured from Lawrence National 
Laboratory 
• In the previous experiment, we tested that our detection mechanism can 
successfully detect the spread of flash worms.  However, we were also 
interested to find out how the detection mechanism would respond to other 
kinds of network traffics. 
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• Instead of generating various Internet traffics as we generated the flash worm 
traffic, we decided to use an archived Internet trace data from [9].  Captured 
from the Lawrence National Laboratory using tcpdump of real WAN traffic, the 
trace data went through a sanitization script to renumber IP addresses and to 
remove all private packet contents.  The sanitization script also separated TCP 
traffic from UDP traffic and places them into different files.  One can capture 
one’s own Internet traffic using tcpdump and use the same sanitization script to 
produce the similar trace data. 
• Traffic Format: 
o The traffic is organized by the following fields:  
 Timestamp of packet arrival, Source host, Destination host, 
Source port, Destination port, Packet size 
o We modified our post-analyzer to use above fields to create spread trees. 
o We did not utilize the port numbers to create different spread trees for 
different port number.  However, in a real world deployment of our 
detection mechanism, the spread trees should be further separated by the 
port number because flash worms will probably use a specific port 
number to spread. 
 
• TCP Traffic 
o The spread tree formulation of the TCP traffic is shown in Fig. 13.  Even 
though more than 150 packet events were processed, there were many 
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attempts to create loops or to create repetitive relationships.  The 
attempts to create loop were avoided and the attempts to recreate 
existing parent-child relationship were ignored.  Therefore, we did not 
see rapid growth of the spread tree. 
o The tree structure seemed to be the reserved formulation of the flash 
worm spread tree.  The total number of nodes in a generation decreases 
as generation number increases.  However, the exact opposite happens in 
flash worm spread tree. 
 
<Fig. 13: Spread Tree of TCP traffic> 
• UDP Traffic 
o In TCP traffic, many network communications were between 2 nodes.  
However, in UDP traffic, we saw more interactions among different 
nodes.  See Fig. 14. 
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o This time we processed about 300 packet events, but still it only created 
5 generations. 
 
<Fig. 14: Spread Tree of UDP traffic > 
 
 
4.4. Breaking our detection mechanism 
 From the previous section, we saw that typical Internet traffic is not likely to trigger 
false detection alarms.  However, there are ways to break our detection mechanism: 
• Slow down the infection process 
o Because nodes are pruned periodically, slowing down the infection 
process with respect to the pruning period, the depth of the spread tree 
may not grow rapidly. 
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• Use customized source and destination addresses 
o Because our current implementation does not allow loops in the tree, 
customized packets can be transmitted in a way that makes the valid 
flash worm packets to be ignored.  For example, before sending a packet 
to infect a node from next generation, source and destination address 
fields can be switched to create a reverse parent-child relation in the tree 
first.  When the actual flash worm packet is processed later, it will 
attempt to create a loop and will be removed. 
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5. Conclusion 
 In this project, we developed a simulator to generate flash worm traffic.  We, then, 
developed an analyzer that can run our proposed geometric-based detection mechanism on 
the traffic.  Our results show that the detection mechanism can be sensitive to the presence 
of the flash worm traffic while maintaining insensitivity to other regular internet traffics.  
Working closely with the packet classification products, we believe that our detection 
mechanism can successfully identify the spread of flash worms. 
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6. Future Work 
  
 First of all, to increase the maximum number of nodes simulated, a different version 
of NS simulator can be used.  PDNS, for example, is a network simulator that can support 
parallel and distributed simulation over multiple PCs.  The need to simulate larger network 
topology may arise when testing our detection mechanism on a shallow spread tree 
topology.  Our current maximum of 10,000 nodes is not sufficient to create flash worm 
traffics with a high infection number.  For example, if each host infects 10 other hosts, it 
only takes 4 generations to infect all 10,000 nodes. 
 
 Secondly, to reduce the occurrence of false alarms, more components can be used to 
identify the unique characteristic of the flash worm spread tree.  In our current construction 
of spread tree, we only use depth as the determining factor to decide whether an outbreak of 
flash worm has occurred.  However, studies can be conducted to find other factors.  For 
example, there is a pattern that the total number of nodes in a generation increases from a 
generation to the next.  It follows the form XG, where X is the maximum infection number 
and G is the generation number.  Such pattern may be use to reduce false alarms. 
 
 Also, in another effort to reduce the false alarms, research can be done on 
integrating the packet classification technology into our detection mechanism.  The ultimate 
goal is to help identify the well known application traffic patterns so that the known “safe” 
network traffic would not be processed into a spread tree.  As an example, we suspect that 
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peer-to-peer traffic is likely to trigger false alarms because of the many parent-child 
relationships amongst a vast number of peers.  If the packet classification technology can 
identify a peer-to-peer traffic, then the traffic would not be processed by our detection 
mechanism, which would reduce the chance of incorrect detections.
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